We have said that Nietzsche’s goal in the Genealogy surpasses that of proposing an
account of the development of morality. He intends to question the value of our
values themselves (particularly our moral values). The one thing Nietzsche does
not question is the value of life itself. This question may be trivial. I am
not certain; but the answer will help in our understanding of Nietzsche claims.
If there is any value in life,
then it would have to lie in the will to power
according to Nietzsche. I draw this
conclusion based upon his assertion that meaning
and/or purpose is only a sign
that a will to power is imposing
itself on something (i.e. on something in the life). This implies that meaning
is variable, as Nietzsche points out. Perhaps more obvious is the implication
that meaning is determined solely by a will
to power. Thus, meaning does not exist without it.
Returning to an earlier
statement, the value in life must be in the will
to power. In this sense, life is almost—if not
entirely—equivalent with the will. Without life, one would not even have the
opportunity to will. Inverting the situation, life without a will seems odd.
This strangeness is likely just a result of my slavish mindset, yet I think the
following question is still helpful: what is life that does not will?
Plants, possibly animals, and
other organisms we do not recognize as possessing a will to power. Would life without a will include the humans of the noble value system? To include humans as
such would be to claim that these humans were not value positing creatures, or
at the very least, that they were not yet value positing creatures. Hence, life
prior to value assertions was simply devoid of meaning. Taking this into account, life as it is read
here possesses a meaning that it never possessed prior to value-positing. This is
a simple logical conclusion given Nietzsche’s premises.
What is the value of life now? I
think it can viably be any number of things according to Nietzsche. We see that a will to power determines meaning. This implies that for every
distinct will, the value in life and of every other possible object is also
distinct (though they could possess similar formulations). I am not satisfied with
this conclusion. I have a more general idea in mind. The value of life is the ability
to conceive of things as valued i.e. to posit values. This appears to be a
tautology given that value positing is made possible via the will to power… which I claimed was
almost the equivalent of life.
If life is not of value because in
it one can posit values, then what is life according to Nietzsche? Is it simply
the setting upon which the Genealogy unfolds and without which nothing would even be possible? To make such a claim would be to take certain things about existence for granted. I will not discuss that here. I think life is more important than this since Nietzsche uses life as something
like a standard with which to determine his acceptance or unacceptance of a
thing (i.e. life is not simply a backdrop). The Nietzschean stamp of approval comes from those wills (and thus
values) which are life-affirmative.
What is the importance of
life-affirmation? I pose this question in the hopes that it will reveal
something about Nietzsche’s conception of life.
I find this topic interesting due to the fact that Nietzsche truly doesn't identify the value of life itself while simultaneously critiquing the values of values. I am not sure I follow all of your will to power logic, but in the end when you claim that "The value of life is the ability to conceive of things as valued i.e. to posit values" I was compelled to agree. However, in some twisted way, wouldn't Nietzsche attempt to instead find out the value of the value of life? At what point to placing value on life become important or necessary? I am not sure I am making sense here, but I hope I'm understanding your chain of logic. As a final question, what would make Nietzsche feel compelled to explain his view of life and its importance? Why place a value on something since he seemingly is challenging those values we give in the first place?
ReplyDeleteYou touch on three ideas within your post that I would like to dissect a little bit.
ReplyDeleteFirst, you aptly identify a central facet of Nietzsche's ideology in the Geneology - that we derive meaning from our wills.
Next, you ask "what is life that does not will?" Nietzsche might identify a life devoid of executed will as an unfulfilled, incomplete sort of existence. He would also point out, I think, that our wills are only powerful insofar as they execute our capabilities. Here, I hearken back to the scenario of the lambs and the birds of prey. By preying upon the lambs as they are naturally inclined (as strong creatures) to do, the birds of prey execute the strength of which they are capable. In this way, they are true to themselves; they do not will themselves to be less powerful than they are or act in such a way, since it is contrary to their inherent nature. Of course, birds of prey (so far as we know, and so far as will be assumed here) do not have the extensive problem-solving or circumstance-weighing capabilities as humans. They do not will in the same way that we will. They set a good precedent however, of acting in a way that is in line with their natural capabilities and instinctive (for humans, we might say moral) nature.
Third, you say that "Life is not simply a backdrop." and ask "What is the importance of life-affirming activity?" In his work titled "Will to Power" Nietzsche says of life-affirmation that: "If we affirm one moment, we thus affirm not only ourselves but all existence. For nothing is self-sufficient, neither in us ourselves nor in things; and if our soul has trembled with happiness and sounded like a harp string just once, all eternity was needed to produce this one event - and in this single moment of affirmation all eternity was called good, redeemed, justified, and affirmed." To me, this quote seems to project the notion that life-affirming activity is our great avenue toward self-actualization. Nietzsche does not use this term in what I have studied of his work, but I would be willing to bet he would agree with my usage of this term. To affirm life with yes-saying activity, we thereby affirm a certain goodness and fullness within ourselves; and, thereby, we derive meaning from and within life. In other words, we have the power to will goodness in the world and within ourselves. Perhaps, Nietzsche is taking a roundabout way of saying that beauty is in the eye of the beholder?
I think that life-affirmation is a prerequisite to values and that denial of life leads to nihilism, or the devaluing of existence. If Nietzsche is afraid of the extinction of human kind due to a kind of body/life denial of Christian slave morality, then proposing life-affirmation is his answer.
ReplyDeleteThe value of life-affirmation is confirmed in life-affirmation. When one says yes to life, one is creating first value, answering the first question with which all other questions of value depend thereon.
This topic has been bothering me as well. If the value of life is the will to power, and the will to power is basically just the active presence, activity, then wouldn't action and value almost be synonymous. Thinking about it that way is especially interesting given what Nietzsche said about those who act out the aristocratic value system. It seemed that for those people the action came first and value only came afterwards, they simply acted as instincts told them and then value sprung, almost naturally, from the 'success' (life affirmation) of their action. It seems like, Yes humans are value creating animals, but only in so far as they are acting animals, but all animals are acting animals. So it must be the WILL to power, but doesn't the act of willing require forethought and a certain amount of base evacuation? Can the person who acts out the aristocratic value system will or can they just act, and only afterwards create the value necessary to interpret action as willed? Nietzsche seems intent on humans following out instinctual drive to act and affirm life (which is synonymous with action), but if we are value-positing creatures, is it not also part of our instincts to follow our values even if those values are contra to action or to life?
ReplyDelete