Descriptive V. Prescriptie, Slave morality and Power, and Morality, Back to the Future

In class on Tuesday we discussed the extent to which Nietzsche’s work is merely descriptive as opposed to prescriptive, and although I tend to agree that his endeavor is, for the most part descriptive, I think that some of the language he uses to discuss slave morality certainly has some elements of judgment as opposed to mere description. The acerbic manner in which he discusses slave morality as "sickening" and "disgusting" as well as the consequences he attributes to it, seem to be at least as critical as descriptive. So, at the very least, we can say that he is critically describing, if not outright judging, slave morality. Although I agree that he is probably not saying that everyone should, or as we discussed in class, even could, rid themselves of slave morality and take up aristocratic morality, the fact of the matter is that many people have read it that way. Furthermore while I see some value in looking at a text, or a philosophy, independent of its’s author’s motivations its historical consequences, I am not entirely convinced that we should, or even can, divorce a text from its historical and cultural location. That being said, I am still on the fence about these issues, and I invite discussion.

There is one other thing that has been bothering me about Nietzsche. I really liked the first few pages of the first section in which Nietzsche engaged in a sort of an entomologically informed historical-sociological look at the development of aristocratic morality and its relationship with power. Then he moved into a discussion of slave morality as coming from the subjugation of one group within that power-laden meaning system, yet, he failed to discuss the ways in which the slave morality was only able to become widespread as Jews and Christians became more powerful. I mean historically, Judeo-Christian morals did not become culturally widespread until they were incorporated into the institutional power structure via Constantine, and later the economic and political power of the Vatican, and even later the economic and political power of protestant Christians in the US, Europe, and all the places colonized by them. It is not as if slave morality, has any less of a power dynamic than aristocratic morality.

 My final bone to pick with Nietzsche, is that he decries slave morality, in favor of a morality which would allow for progress and the continued development of the human race (or factions within it), yet, in looking forward, where does he look? But backward to a morality which existed before slave morality. Should not, Nietzsche look forward to an, as yet undiscovered, new, type of morality, one which is entirely different from not only slave morality, but aristocratic morality as well. However, I do not know if this is a fair criticism, because it seems like Nietzsche sees aristocratic morality not as a type in itself, not as something constructed and artificial, (as is the case with slave morality), but instead as something that is natural and almost self-evident. Like I said, I am not set in any of these critiques, they have just been floating around in my head.