In his passage known as the master-slave dialectic, Hegel notes that "For this consciousness [the one which becomes the slave] has been fearful, not of this or that particular thing or just at odd moments, but its whole being has been seized with dread; for it has experienced the fear of death, the absolute Lord" (paragraph 194). Here I take Hegel to mean that this consciousness, in the life and death experience, has realized its desire to be recognized will become an impossibility if she dies.Thus, to prevent this she negates the possibility of her desire's absolute negation by submitting, or "backing down" in the game of chicken. Hegel goes on to write that "in fear, the being-for-itself is present in the bondsman himself; in fashioning the thing, he becomes aware that being-for-self belongs to him, that he himself exists essentially and actually in his own right" (paragraph 118). From my reading, fear is essential to the process that the slave consciousness goes through because of its ability to make the consciousness realize that it possesses this being-for-self.
I was motivated to ask the title question because in my experience with Early Modern philosophy there is no real discussion or attention given to the role or importance of fear, anxiety, dread, anguish, etc. in the works of authors like Kant, Bacon, Locke, Hume, or Bentham. From my understanding of philosophical history, the previously mentioned ideas become crucial in the works of phenomenologists and existentialists like Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre. So where then does this interest and attention to fear and concepts like it begin? It appears that the master-slave dialectic is an early beginning of this philosophical attention being given to these types of ideas.
Here is where we get to the question in the title: Is fear the only trigger for consciousness' realization of its possession of being-for-self? At least from the little musing I have given to this thought, I think that we should be skeptical of the claim that fear alone can make a consciousness aware of its possession of being-for-self. For example, overcoming an intense obstacle or meeting a meaningful goal seem like reasonable candidates that could also allow for a consciousness realize its being-for-self. Both of these importantly include work or service which Hegel notes is necessary for the slave's realization. A potential response could be that these instances include moments of fear, but they are not the overwhelming, eclipsing fear that Hegel speaks of. Essentially, I'm proposing that fear may not be the only instance in which realization of being-for-self and work are together and thus that other situations may produce the same lesson that the slave consciousness attains as described in the master slave dialectic.
To him who looks upon the world rationally, the world looks rationally back. --G.W.F. Hegel
I had a similar problem with the life and death struggle in "Lordship and Bondage." For all its dramatic power, it strikes me as a little extreme. Instead of each consciousness staking its life, couldn't they sacrifice their desires or personal interests? Wouldn't that also demonstrate their ability to choose things non-advantageous for themselves, in order to be recognized as a free consciousness? And I think Hegel would probably agree that these sorts of encounters occur much more often than life or death encounters. Just as I think he would concede small moments of fear, like the fear experienced when confronting a great obstacle, occur more often than totally gripping fear of death. This seems like a valid interpretation of the master-slave dialectic: that other, less extreme encounters can approximate the dynamic of the life or death struggle, without all the life or death drama.
ReplyDeleteBearing in mind that the master-slave dialectic is only a stage in the course of consciousness' development, I wonder if the whole experience of life, death, and overwhelming fear can be avoided by working one's way logically through this development, much like readers of the Phenomenology. This question still bothered me after the final section; how much of this developmental process does a consciousness need to actually experience, and how much of it can a consciousness reason its way out of? If I know the master-slave relationship will ultimately prove unfulfilling and unhelpful, can I avoid it altogether, or do I have to experience this kind of unequal power dynamic to move beyond it (even if I experience it in the less extreme form of a life and death struggle)? At times it seems like Hegel emphasizes the importance of experience, like in 802: "For this reason it must be said that nothing in known that is not in experience, or, as it is also expressed, that is not felt to be true [ ... ] For experience is just this, that the content--which is Spirit--is in itself substance, and therefore an object of consciousness." But other times it seems like "knowing" is just as good as, if not that same as, "experiencing" : "This is aware that its knowledge is a knowledge of what is absolutely essential, it knows that being is simply and solely pure willing and knowing; it is nothing else but this willing and knowing" (792). If "experiencing" is a function of individuality (and this might be an unfounded assumption) and "knowing" a function of universality, perhaps my question boils down to a question about the relationship between the universal and the individual. Does the universal depend on the experience of the individual, or is the experience of the individual already informed and shaped by the knowledge of the universal? Or is it a little bit of both? To try and bring this digression back to your question, do you have to experience fear to know fear (and to know being-for-self), or is knowing being-for-self as good as having experienced the fear that lead to this knowledge?
I think that things that are variants of fear are the only triggers. If we look at fear as one-dimensional, as in fear of the master or death or a monster under the bed, it does seem like things other than fear can allow a person to realize being for self. However, if we view fear as broader than this, then it seems like fear is the only trigger. I'm not so sure that the examples you cite like overcoming an obstacle or meeting a goal are really distinct from fear. They both involve uncertainty. If I have a goal, I recognize that I won't meet the goal purely as a result of having it. There is something uncertain about my meeting the goal. When I set out to meet the goal, I am acknowledging that uncertainty. But this could easily be re-characterized as fear. I have a fear of not meeting my goal because it is uncertain. Then I set out to meet the goal through work. Through this work I discover my being for self.
ReplyDeleteFear is a complicated phenomenon. There is fear of spiders, fear of water, etc. What makes the fear Hegel is referring to relevant to being-for-self realizing is that it is fear of death. Unlike other fears, the fear of death requires one to be aware of the self.
ReplyDeleteThe problem I see with this is not what kinds of fear or difficulties lead to awareness of being-for-self, but rather a chicken or egg dilemma that the it creates. Is fear (or difficulty) a sufficient or necessary condition for being-for-self? One would imagine that I couldn't fear of death or encounter difficulty unless I already was aware of my being-for-self, but Hegel seems to think the opposite because of his more action-oriented understanding of how people encounter and acquire concepts.