Noumena and Truth

Hegel's first work, The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of Philosophy, acts as a preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit's preface. In both of these texts, Hegel addresses the limitations of noumena as a concept, specifically the inability of the subject to access a thing in of itself outside of the human sensorium. As Georg Lukacs observes, "For Hegel the terms 'in itself' and 'for us' are by no means opposites; in fact they are necessary correlatives. That something exists merely 'in itself' means for Hegel that it merely exists 'for us'. The antithesis of 'for us or in itself' is rather 'for itself', namely that mode of being posited where the fact that an object is thought of implies at the same time that the object is conscious of itself." In other words, the human subject's consciousness must be incorporated into any empirical system, that is, it must be accounted for, in its idiosyncrasies, and biases. Appropriating a system--like the one in natural science--to help create a methodological distance from the subject--in effect, compensating for the failures of human faculties--fails for the very reason that human beings will end up translating the results for comprehension. No matter how regimented this process becomes, the observer/scientist gets no closer to knowing an object independent of human consciousness. As a massive deviation from German idealists like Kant, Schelling, and Fichte, this act of reorientation appears justifiably revolutionary. Given the studied limitations of the subject's observational faculties, one can easily understand why philosophers--since the beginning of philosophy--attempted to find ways around this issue. In some respects, Hegel continues this project; however, his solution involves a recognition and acceptance of this limitation, in an attempt to translate the world into terms that appear rational to the subject. Within this system, the result--that is, correctness--must be combined with the method: "To judge a thing that has substance and solid worth is quite easy, to comprehend it is much harder, and to blend judgment and comprehension in a definitive description is the hardest thing of all" (P. of S. § 3). With this project in mind, how does the conception of capital 'T' Truth change? Again, it requires a both-ness, that is, the conjunction of both 'subjective or objective certitude' and 'Being' (Outlines of Hegel's Phenomenology § 42). Philosophy, as a discipline, serves this process by the creating the categories through which Science (and other sectors) conceptualize the world, render it comprehensible. In addition to terminology,  philosophy provides the methods for comprehension.